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Abstract Although customary marine tenure (CMT) systems for the manage-
ment of local marine resources occur throughout the world, compared with
other models of fisheries management they remain relatively little known. The
Pac ific Basin is especially rich in CMT systems, which play key roles in overall
wcial, economic and cultural life of societies. Based on a Solomon Island
example, we examine the organizational principles and potentials of CMT
systems to provide sustainable yields and equitable access to resources, their
resilience to external pressures, and mechanisms for ensuring local autonomy
in resource control. Next we demonstrate that CMT systems are an expression
of traditional ecological knowledge, and show the importance of such knowl-
edge to scientific research and the planning of resource management. Finally,
we suggest priorities for research on CMT systems.
Keywords community-based management, fisheries management, traditional
environmental knowledge, traditional conservation, Pacific Basin, Solomon
Islands.
Introduction
It is ironic that despite the now well-documented and widely accepted inadequacy
of fisheries management in many parts of the "First World" that Western bio-
logical and economic models are still those generally recommended for fisheries
development and management in Third World contexts. This irony is com-
pounded, first because in many Third World societies there already exist sophis-
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ticated fisheries management systems well-adapted for local use; second, because
similar systems also exist (although often extra-legally) in many parts of the First
World; and third, because many such Third World systems might be readily
adaptable for managing fisheries in the First World.
Much of the Western fisheries management theory is misleading, owing to the
widely accepted but erroneous assumption that the misuse of fishery resources
stems from the institution of common property.' But this ignores the specific
socio-cultural context of a given common property, and so ignores local customs
and behavior that might modify resource uses.
Resource depletion is not inevitable: users of common property resources are
not always selfish and unhampered by social sanctions, as has been conclusively
demonstrated by many recent studies of coastal fishing societies that have doc-
umented the existence in many widely differing parts of the world of often time-
honored, local fisheries management systems that regulate access to and exploi-
tation of resources. The published literature now includes anthologies of case
studies of customary marine tenure (CMT) systems, especially from the Western
Pacific (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984a), the Pacific Basin and Indo-Pacific Region
(Ruddle and Johannes 1985, 1990), the Caribbean and Latin America (Cordell,
1989), as well as from riverine environments in Africa (Scudder and Connelly
1985).- Such systems are not limited to the Third World, as shown by recent
comprehensive studies of CMT systems in the mainstream politics of industrial-
ized nations, such as Canada and the U.S.A. (Pinkerton 1989), Japan (Ruddle
1987), Australia (Gray and Zann 1988), and New Zealand (Waitangi Tribunal 1988;
Levine 1989).
The Pacific Basin is especially rich in excellent examples of complex and
elaborate CMT systems which play key roles in overall social, economic, and
cultural contexts. Organizational concepts range from the quasi-ownership of
specific sites by individuals, families, clans, or other small social group, to the
complex state legal system of Japan. However, in that vast region the local com-
munity is often the sole owner that controls the local spectrum of marine habitats.
Such CMT systems are a practical antithesis to common property-open access
models, and embody fundamental concepts relevant to fisheries management
worldwide. Although eroded or even broken-down in parts of the region, espe-
cially because of colonialism or neo-colonialism, CMT systems are still used to
manage coastal fisheries in a wide range of island societies, under broadly similar
' This is well-known. For excellent treatments see McCay and Acheson (eds.) 1987 and
Berkes (ed.) 1989. among others.
^ In "customary marine tenure", "customary" refers to an institution that has continuous
links with the past as it adapts to handling contemporary issues; "marine" refers to the
institution as dealing with reef, lagoon, coast, and open sea, including islands and islets
within this overall seaspace; and "tenure" refers to a social process of activities in main-
taining control over territory and access to resources (Hviding 1989; 1991). The CMT
concept thus goes beyond the implication of such concepts as TURF (Territorial Use
Rights in Fisheries Icf. Christy 1982]) that the utilization of fishery resources is the only
concern of such institutions, or "co-management", the basic concept of which is the
mutual accommodation and sharing of management responsibility between local and na-
tional systems (although it should be noted that in many areas CMT might eventually
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biophysical and socioeconomic conditions. Increasingly, CMT is challenged by
efforts to commercialize and intensify local fisheries. It is also confronted by
tourism development and by such land-based activities as logging and mining.
This is the case particularly in Melanesia. In a number of instances, local man-
agement systems have shown considerable capacity to cope with such pressures
(Baines 1985; Hviding 1988; Ruddle and Johannes 1990; Hviding and Baines
1992).
Nevertheless, understanding of CMT systems in the Pacific Basin, as else-
where, has been hampered by the dominant Western assumption that fish are an
open access resource. Although plausible offshore, such a notion is far less ap-
plicable to small-scale inshore fisheries, since the resource areas in question are
often closely integrated with adjacent land, ecologically as well as conceptually,
in terms of local culture. The majority of fishermen and fisherwomen in the South
Pacific, as elsewhere in the tropics, are predominantly part-timers, combining
fishing and farming. It is typical of this region that land and sea and their asso-
ciated occupations are seen as economically and nutritionally complementary
domains, and not dichotomized along Western lines into "ownable land" and
"unownable sea" (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984b; Ruddle 1988). A concept of "cor-
porate estate", a territory held jointly by a kinship-based group and embracing a
connected range of terrestrial and marine resource zones, is widespread in the
South Pacific (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984b). Examples include the Hawaiian ahu-
pua'a (Meller and Horowitz 1987), the Yap tabinau (Lingenfelter 1975; Schneider
1984), the Fijian vanua (Nayacakalou 1971; Ravuvu 1983), the Marovo (Solomon
Islands) puava (Hviding 1990), and the estate of the Yolngu aboriginals of North





Figure 1. An example of the South Pacific "integrated corporate estate" concept; The
Marovo (Solomon Islands) puava, showing environmental zones and indigenous classifi-
cation (after Hviding 1992).252 Ruddle, Hviding, and Johannes
Social Principles: A Framework for the Analysis of CMT Systems
In this section we examine the organizational potentials of CMT systems in terms
of their capacity to provide sustainable yields and equitable access, resilience to
external pressures, and maintenance of local autonomy in controlling resources.
We do this using a case study of a CMT system in Marovo Lagoon, Solomon
Islands, which exemplifies social processes generated by basic principles and
shaped by initiatives from the world outside. This CMT system is characterized
by a high degree of complexity, flexibility, and success in meeting contemporary
pressures, and so provides empirical insights into micro- and macro-level pro-
cesses in the local management of marine areas and resources (Hviding 1990),
A recent review (Ruddle 1988) indicates that the underlying basis of CMT
systems in Oceania shows clear correlations among the tenure or ownership of
marine areas, the distribution of resource rights, and the organization of activities
and political groups. Management systems in the aquatic domain frequently mir-
ror those on land, and are integral components of regional systems of resource
holding and management that embrace entire islands or, for example, larger la-
goon areas and adjacent shores. Having a firm base in local tradition and custom-
ary law. Pacific Island marine tenure systems are intimately bound within the
wider cultural system of a society, and consist of complex social relationships
regulating the access to marine resources. Although CMT systems may. in eco-
nomic terms, be considered a form of fisheries management, at a higher level they
form part of large-scale socio-political and spatial relationships.
From the available documentation and from established social science theory,
it is clear that a corporate estate such as described here does not exist in isolation.
Rather, the very nature of a social group as a "corporation" controlling an "es-
tate" (cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1952:34) is based on its coexistence with other, similar
groups also exercising corporate rights over similar estates (cf. Keesing 1981). In
all the examples mentioned above, CMT forms part of a greater regional system
of control over territories and resources, and corporate rights, inherited through
generations, involve more than just access to economically valued resources,
such as fish: By acting as management units controlling defined territories of sea
(and/or land), kin-based groups acquire distinct identities in relation to other
groups. CMT systems thus have fishery management as but one aspect of their
role in society and history, and contain a number of opportunities for achieving
ecologically, economically and socially integrated approaches in resource man-
agement (cf. Hviding and Baines 1992).
CMT systems are basically systems of social relationships that involve par-
ticipants and operators, in groups and as individuals and in different capacities, as
right-holders, decision-makers, insiders, and outsiders. Such systems are gener-
ated, maintained, and transformed in social process (Hviding 1990).
To understand these processes, an awareness of certain basic social principles
underlying their dynamics is required. Ruddle (1988) has identified the following
six underlying principles for the South Pacific: (1) Sea rights depend on social
status; (2) resource exploitation is governed by use rights; (3) resource use terri-
tories are defined; (4) marine resources are controlled by traditional authorities;
(5) conservation was traditionally widely practised; and (6) sanctions and punish-
ments are meted out for infringement of regulations. We resume this discussion
below.Management and Customary Tenure 253










Figure 2- The Marovo area and population distribution, based on 1986 national census
(SIG 1989).
A Case Study: Marovo Lagoon, Solomon Islands^
The Marovo area (Fig. 2), in Western Province, Solomon Islands, southwestern
Pacific, contains an extensive and ecologically complex 700 km2 reef and lagoon
environment (Stoddart 1969). This provides the core of existence for a population
of some 9,500 persons, living in small villages on and near the coasts of the three
high volcanic islands that face the lagoon."*
The elevated reef which runs the length of Marovo lagoon contains a wealth of
marine resources (Hviding 1988). In particular, the most important fishing
grounds of Marovo are located here. A great variety of food fishes (the local
taxonomy contains approximately 400 species, most of which are exploited) oc-
curs on and around the barrier reef. In the open sea and around outlying islands,
schooling tuna and nesting turtles seasonally support important subsistence fish-
eries. On the barrier reef flats and further inshore in the deep lagoon, large stocks
^ This case study is based on research in Marovo Lagoon by Hviding, in 1986-87. 1989-90
and 1991-92, for a total of two years. Fieldwork was funded by the Norwegian Research
Council for Science and the Humanities (NAVF) and the Institute for Comparative Re-
search in Human Culture, Oslo. The 1986-87 period included one month of research with
R. E. Johannes.
•* This estimate is based on a projection of 1986 national census data (SIG 1989).254 Ruddle, Hviding, and Johannes
of beche-de-mer and of such commercial shells as trochus and pearlshell variously
form the basis of an intermittently booming cash sector in Marovo villages. The
coastal mangrove areas contain ample stocks of shells and crabs, exploited mainly
by women, and which figure prominently in the subsistence diet of village house-
holds. A strong tradition of environmental knowledge, as well as the still essen-
tially lightly exploited nature of most marine resources, provides a strong element
of predictability and certainty in fishing and marine gathering (cf. Johannes and
Hviding 1987). Local knowledge of natural processes and regular occurrences,
such as growth rates of important shells and spawning aggregations of important
food fishes, informs decisions made by managers of different corporate descent
groups {butubutu) about fishery management measures and their enforcement.
Rights of control over resources are held by butubutu, mostly in the form of
land-and-sea estates ipuava). As such, the Marovo case exemplifies a basic type
of customary resource management widespread in the South Pacific. The system
of customary marine tenure, tied to ancestral title and integrated with land tenure,
thus embraces more than mere "fishing rights". Reef and lagoon rights are not
distributed equally among all villages. Rather, they are held mainly by those
descent groups having an historical "origin" as coastal dwellers, and which have
reefs and sea as the main component of their holdings. In contrast, groups that
were bush dwellers in pre-Christian times now hold mainly land areas, but have
obtained extensive use rights in fishing grounds.
Marovo society consists of more than twenty named butubutu, half of which
have primary rights over sections of lagoon and barrier reef (defined by lateral
boundaries). The other half have land rights as their focus. A number of institu-
tions link the different butubutu. These are based partly on the reciprocal ex-
change between neighboring "coastal" and "bush" groups of use rights in fishing
grounds and in mainland rainforest, and, for the CMT system, on complexes of
joint use between members of butubutu that control adjacent sections of lagoon
and reefs.
The CMT of Marovo is a highly flexible and adaptive system of local resource
management that can handle many contemporary local issues related to subsis-
tence and commercial use, as well as those involving demographic and political
change. There is a continuous adaptation of the regulations enforced on marine
resource use by different descent groups, with negotiation between individual
fishermen and descent groups, based on kinship ties, on who should have access
to which areas. In addition to territorial access rights, there is a fluctuating variety
of regulations concerning permitted technologies and target species.
In recent years, the Marovo people have become increasingly involved in
negotiating access to the rich resources of their estates with a number of external
agents, such as national government and transnational resource extraction com-
panies, thus their present CMT system is linked with processes reaching far into
the wider world. Large-scale commercial fishing, mining, and logging are all con-
temporary concerns of Marovo marine tenure, the latter two because they are
perceived as potentially serious sources of pollution to the marine resource base.
Reef-and-lagoon holding groups have, in recent years, resisted mining and logging
developments on the land of "bush" people, out of concerns for potential river-
borne accelerated sedimentation damaging their reefs. A number of "pan-
Marovo" initiatives, linking most reef-holding groups, have emerged in this pro-
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Marovo Lagoon has long been of interest for the development of a commercial
fishery, better organized than the present intermittent village-based fishing enter-
prises. However, the development potential may be more apparent than real,
because of widespread local opposition to external large-scale fishing, based on a
prevailing perception among rights-holders of a limited resource base, and be-
cause few people are interested in long-term full-time fishing since their traditional
economic strategies are based on a high degree of diversity and fiexibility, alter-
nating between subsistence and commercial production and exploiting different
resource types. As Rodman (1987) has observed of rural Vanuatu, so too in
Marovo, almost no one is willing to be a "full-time anything". In Marovo, fishing
groups are of shifting composition, and most people fish commercially only in-
termittently. The principles of the Marovo CMT system are fundamental in shap-
ing the fishery development potential: Since the rights to fish derive from a per-
son's place in an integrated system of territories and groups, they do not have to
be validated by continuous active fishing, as would be the case in a modern fishery
cooperative. Further, the "fixed-territory"-nature of Marovo fishing poses a clear
spatial constraint on commercial development, since it limits expansion of inten-
sive commercial fishing beyond the area of each fisherman's group. Moreover,
fishing could be expanded only marginally beyond the Marovo area owing to
nearby deep waters and because there are similar CMT systems along coasts to
the west. Thus Marovo Lagoon is a limited, isolated fishing area of defined extent,
in which fish stocks could become depleted. This is fully recognized by Marovo
people (Hviding 1988).
Parallels between CMT Systems and Fishery Cooperatives
Local commercial fisheries are often organized cooperatively, and frequently
serve to reduce dependency, risk, and uncertainty in fishermen's dealings with the
market (Acheson 1981). So many different forms of fishermen's organizations
have been termed "fishery cooperative" that a general definition is difficult.
However, they are commonly characterized by democratic control by the mem-
bership (usually by a one-man-one-vote rule), and easy and voluntary entry; by all
members sharing equally in capitalization, operations and risks, and profits are
commonly distributed according to participation in activities rather than on capital
invested; and cooperatives are legally registered associations, rather than loosely
organized groups of individuals (Orbach 1980).
Although cooperatives are often viewed as a general solution to many prob-
lems of small-scale fishermen (Acheson 1981), many of their organizational con-
cepts pertain more to industrial fisheries. This, plus the many failures of devel-
opment projects based on them, casts doubts on the general usefulness of fisheries
cooperatives. Further, the growing appreciation of CMT systems demands a fresh
examination of fishery cooperatives and alternatives presented by local traditional
organizations.
In this respect some attributes of the Marovo CMT system are instructive. In
Marovo the butuhutu is a form of indigenous fishery cooperative, although not
specialized in fisheries. As a corporate group it performs a variety of tasks related
to its land and sea holdings, as well as to its members' relations with other groups
and political institutions. On the other hand, the hutubutu is a type of fishery
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association according to customary law, notwithstanding a lack of registration
under State law; each member profits according to activity, because products
from group resources are distributed among the membership proportionate to
level of fishing activity; the customary rights of each member, that together form
the corporate "'collection of rights" required for effective resource control of a
collective estate, rather than capital per se. are contributed; and a butubutu is
fairly democratically controlled since the traditional decision-making power of
leaders is largely subject to the approval of the other resident members. In con-
trast, easy and voluntary entry is not a characteristic of a bidtttbutu, since the only
normal way of entering is through inherited rights. Membership in this kind of
"fishery management cooperative" is ascribed at birth, and is for all practical
purposes a lifetime entitlement. Entering the group through marriage confers only
secondary entitlements.
A Marovo btttubtitu functions as a local management organization, regulating
resource use in the puava (estate) from a basis of exclusive rights of control over
marine and terrestrial resources. Active fishermen and fisherwomen and knowl-
edgeable elders monitor environmental changes related to the resource bases.
This type of grouping is capable of handling various issues of commercialization
and resource scarcity. The crucial element of/jM/H^MrM-level management is that
subsistence and commercial exploitation are fully integrated and based on local
ideas about self-reliance.
It can be argued, therefore, that introduced cooperative groupings are not
needed for solving the local tasks of marine resource management in a place like
Marovo. Instead, the focus should be on solving the wider organizational prob-
lems of appropriate commercial fishery development, especially those of market-
ing, transport, storage, provision of equipment, and coping with extralocal orga-
nizations. These points are illustrated by an example of reactions in Marovo to the
establishment of a commercial fishery project. The local response to and partic-
ipation in project planning demonstrates the organizational potentials of a viable
and adaptive CMT system, particularly in terms of "participatory planning". The
example also constitutes a social process via which the six organizational princi-
ples, mentioned above, are activated in sequences of actual events.
Local Reactions to Fishery Development
In 1987, the Seventh-day Adventist Church planned to establish in Marovo a large
freezer and improved transport and marketing facilities to support organized com-
mercial fishing, so as to increase cash-earning opportunities for the villagers. The
project was initiated by expatriate administrators of the church. The initial steer-
ing group consisted of expatriate and national church administrators, plus some
Marovo representatives. But some of the coastal, reef-holding butubutu soon
objected that despite having supreme traditional control over fishing grounds they
were under-represented. Some influential leaders from coastal groups were then
asked to join.
Then the chief of a coastal butubutu that traditionally shared its fishing
grounds with groups of bush people announced a plan for managing the reefs of his
people, now that commercial fishing was about to intensify. He would close to the
bush groups defined sections of "his" reefs. He announced that henceforth more
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of the primary marine rightholders, and trespass would be punished by placing
further limitations on fishing by bush people.
At a meeting in mid-1987, the expatriate members of the steering group rec-
ognized some local concern for the future of susbsistence resources were com-
mercial fishing to be intensified considerably. They proposed some complex man-
agement devices, to be organized by the fishery project, such as zoning of the
lagoon for monitoring purposes. In response, they were bluntly informed by a
powerful local member of the steering group that management, monitoring, and
other conservation efforts were not at all the responsibility of expatriate church
administrators, nor of the fishery project. He argued that it was the responsibility
of the project to provide storage, marketing, and transport facilities, whereas il
was up to the butubtiti4 of Marovo and their leaders to ensure the management of
fish stocks in their own puava. Most villagers endorsed the opportunities offered
by the project, but many also emphasized that it was important for the reef-
holding groups controlling Marovo's fishing grounds to now strengthen their ma-
rine tenure regulations.
The fish freezer started operating In 1988, and has been fraught with a number
of difficulties relating not least to the part-time nature of local commercial fishing.
Nevertheless, after about a year of operation, some optimism was expressed by
both church officials and fishermen, the latter commenting positively that the
former had followed the advice given, and had left resource management issues to
the reef-holding groups. Through the CMT system, several btitubutu imposed a
number of strengthened limitations on access to reefs for commercial fishing.
For example, some reef-holding butubutu restricted commercial fishing by
outsiders, e.g., people from mainland bush groups, while maintaining the long-
standing use rights of these people to fish for subsistence purposes. This was
aimed explicitly at putting a ceiling on the transformation offish stocks into cash,
and thereby to preserve future food stocks. Similarly, certain reef-holding groups
have imposed strong restrictions on the gathering of commercial shells by "bush"
outsiders, so as to reserve this source of cash for themselves. In these cases, too,
the rights of the "bush groups" to catch fish for subsistence or modest marketing
were not affected (Hviding 1988). With the demise of the Seventh-day Adventist
freezer operation, in 1991 (largely because of financial problems), and the con-
current shift from pearl shells to beche-de-mer as a focus in commercial "marine"
products, CMT enforcement throughout Marovo Lagoon became more relaxed.
Rather than specific regulations on technologies, economic modes or target spe-
cies, the general well-being of the lagoon in the face of proposed mining and
logging activities has been the main concern of reef-holding butubutu.
Social Principles Activated
The example of the Marovo fish freezer demonstrates how key principles under-
lying a viable CMT system can determine the organization of local fishery devel-
opment. These underlying principles generate dynamic processes whereby day-
to-day management of fishery resources is shaped according to the changing
circumstances perceived by local reef-holding groups.
In terms of the social principles (Ruddle 1988) noted above, it is clear that the
distinction between bush people and coastal people in Marovo remains crucial to
the actual distribution of decision-making power in resource management. In258 Ruddle, Hviding, and Johannes
other words, sea rights depend on social status. Further, resource exploitation is
governed by use rights. A fishery project predicated on the assumption that con-
trol over fishing grounds and use rights are equally distributed among Marovo
villages would meet with serious problems. In this case, to perceive Marovo
fishing rights as being vested with "village cooperatives," each village "owning"
its adjacent fishing areas, and to give such village units some formal legal status,
would be to override fundamental social relationships whereby a primary right-
holder grants secondary use rights according to customary obligations of reci-
procity.
Reactions to larger fishery projects also follow a pattern where each reef-
holding group formulates its own set of regulations to handle emerging changes in
marine resource use within its own defined area. Thus, resource territories are
defined, in the Marovo case, as in many other CMT systems, by means of rec-
ognized marine boundaries. The formulation of area-specific management mea-
sures is tied to the uniqueness of each butubutu's situation, and handles local
variation in a way that would not be possible for a more formal, homogenous, and
centralized fisheries management system.
The "hands ofT'-argument presented to church authorities by an infiuential
local leader is an indication of Marovo people's emphasis on indigenous auton-
omy, by keeping the control and management of marine resources in local hands.
Fishery management legislation of a "foreign" nature imposed by outside agen-
cies is unlikely to elicit compliance in an area like Marovo, where customary
resource management continues to have a strong position. Marine resources are
controlled by traditional authorities, who, further, might insist on playing a key
role in project planning. Further, as demonstrated by the chief who announced
new restrictions on access to "his" reefs, sanctions and punishments are meted
out for infringement of regulations.
The ability to monitor changes in fish stocks, to predict ecological conse-
quences of intensified resource exploitation, and to suggest relevant new man-
agement measures are important aspects of Marovo people's traditional marine
knowledge (Johannes and Hviding 1987; Hviding 1988). Initiatives by individual
fishermen provide an input in each butubutu's cooperative efforts to formulate a
management policy. Basic to this process is a concern for the sustained well-being
of each group's limited resource base; i.e., resource conservation is practised.
That these concerns for sustained yield rely on mostly pragmatic economic mo-
tives, which they appear to do in the Marovo case, is a moot point so long as the
concerns have positive implications for the resource base.
Reef-Holding Groups in Confrontation with the Tuna Industry
To conclude this case study, processes whereby local reef-and-lagoon managers
interact through the CMT system to link with national and international entities
are examined. Resource management tasks in Marovo increasingly involve not
only dilTerent local butubutu, but also extralocal participants that include tourist
resort operators, yacht crews, transnational fishing, mining and logging compa-
nies, and a variety of businessmen based in Honiara, the national capital. The
contemporary Marovo CMT system is thus characterized by more complex and
far-ranging processes than was the "purely traditional" system (Hviding and
Baines 1992).
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tional tuna-fishing industry. Tuna company boats enter Marovo Lagoon nightly,
during the March-November season, to net live baitfish. To meet demands from
local reef-holding groups and regulate operations, a national system of formally
defined "bait grounds" was established. In Marovo bait ground boundaries are
based partly on customary ones (Baines 1985; Evans and Nichols n.d. [1986];
Hviding 1988), and "royalties" are paid on a per night/per vessel basis to desig-
nated trustees of each bait ground.
This system, originally intended to comply with the demands of traditional
reef-holding groups, has created some conflict in Marovo. Although some trustees
act as expected and use the royalties for community benefit, others see them-
selves, prompted partly by the European-derived official government view of
resource "ownership", as sole "owners" of the bait ground, and keep the roy-
alties for their own use. This, plus disputes over the non-traditional nature of
some bait ground boundaries, has led to local court cases.
To avoid conflict, and because of a belief that bait-fishing disturbs food fish
stocks, some local leaders have closed grounds. Such closures are generally re-
spected by the tuna boats, but have caused some concern among high-level fish-
eries administrators because the pole-and-line tuna fishery remains totally depen-
dent on a continuous supply of live bait from areas like Marovo.
This example demonstrates how local-level social principles and concerns
embedded in the Marovo CMT system generate processes that have implications
far beyond the local fishery and society. The tuna bait ground issue is a striking
example of the forceful articulation of local sea rights with national and interna-
tional systems. Similar cases have occurred elsewhere in Melanesia, as in Fiji and
Papua New Guinea, for example (Kent 1980; Johannes 1981; Turner 1991).
It is clear, then, that the concepts embodied in "customary marine tenure"
define social institutions which regulate the relationship between society and the
marine environment. These institutions involve people as individuals and in
groups, and, moreover, people in interaction, using their knowledge and ideas to
accomplish certain ends vis-a-vis each other. One facet of a deeper understanding
of marine tenure systems is a focus precisely on the events and scenes where
people interact and where marine tenure is an issue. This focus must be on what
actually happens on a fishing ground, in order to identify patterns in the multitude
of decisions made and actions taken by individual fishermen and resource man-
agers (see Hviding 1990).
The essence of dynamics in CMT systems is people managing and negotiating
access to valued marine resources, each individual or group acting from a firm
basis within a social system; in the Marovo case a flexible and fluid system of
adherence to descent groups. Although the Marovo CMT system may be referred
to as a traditional resource management system with a basis in "customary law",
this by no means implies that "tradition" is something static and non-changing.
Rather, "tradition" or "customary law", in the Marovo case as elsewhere in the
changing worlds of indigenous peoples, is characterized on the one hand by hav-
ing firm roots in local history, practice, and space, and on the other by being
unwritten and non-codified, thus permitting continuous adaptation to changing
circumstances. Through such processes of continuous interaction, with constant
dual reference to continuity and change, to past generations as well as to present
challenges, distinct social groups carry out long-term management of their marine
resources, in some cases probably achieving sustainable yields. This affords a260 Ruddle, Hviding, and Johannes
potential means of achieving adaptive and participatory planning of fisheries de-
velopment through the close involvement of resource-controlling local groups. On
the individual level, the twin principles relating to social status and use rights are
major determinants in the day-to-day fishing strategies followed by each fisher-
man: Detailed environmental knowledge indicates where one should go fishing to
maximize the catch, but marine tenure regulations constrain these choices to
where fishing may legitimately take place, according to rights held or permissions
sought (Hviding 1990).
Finally, it must be emphasized that proper analysis of CMT systems must pay
close attention to the macro-level contexts that provide opportunities and con-
straints for local fishery management strategies. Organizational capacity and po-
tential on the local level is not in itself enough to ensure efficient functioning of a
CMT system; it is also a necessary precondition that encompassing legal-political
systems acknowledge, if not actively support, the principles underiying local-level
resource control and management. For example, in Solomon Islands the implicit
recognition given to customary marine and land tenure systems in government
legislation (Baines 1985) provides added organizational power, and has made
possible the negotiations of the bait ground system. Such a pattern prevails in the
Melanesian nations, which is also that part of Oceania where CMT systems ap-
pear to be the most capable of coping with contemporary pressures (Hviding and
Ruddle 1991).
The Role of Traditional Environmental Knowledge in CMT Systems
Traditional environmental knowledge is an important cultural resource that guides
and sustains the operation of CMT systems. Understanding such knowledge,
whether accompanied or not by perceptions of inshore marine resources as being
finite and therefore depletable, is thus an inseparable part of both research on
CMT systems and of management designs based on them. Such knowledge may
or may not be linked with a traditional resource conservation ethic.
The attitude of many biological scientists and natural resource managers to
traditional knowledge of local environment was formerly usually one of unthink-
ing dismissal. As observed by Chambers, "Modern scientific knowledge and the
indigenous technical knowledge of rural people are grotesquely unequal in lever-
age. ... it is difficult for some professions to accept that they have anything to
learn from rural people, or to recognise that there is a parallel system of knowl-
edge to their own which is complementary, that is usually valid and in some
respects superior" (Chambers 1980:20-21).
Such attitudes undoubtedly arise because most biologists have not been
trained to seek knowledge through talking with "laymen"; they go first to books,
then directly to nature for their answers. At home they begin research by reading,
because much of what is already known about local environments there can
usually be found in libraries. But when they extend their research to non-Western
societies their training blinds them; there important portions of this kind of knowl-
edge can be found only in the heads of certain local people, and it is passed on
orally between generations.
Fortunately this attitude has been changing, owing to increased recognition of
the value of indigenous environmental expertise. And for a growing number of
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methods associated mostly with social scientists—have become important re-
search tools. In the Pacific Basin where scientific knowledge of the biology of
seafood stocks and their environment lags well behind that available for temperate
waters, local knowledge can play an especially important role in marine resource
management (Johannes 1980).
Pacific islanders' knowledge concerning the timing, location, and behavior of
spawning aggregations of reef and lagoon fishes provides an illustration. Popula-
tions of individual such fish are usually thinly and unevenly distributed, making
censusing (an important tool of the manager of any wild animal population) almost
impossible. But when these fish spawn, they characteristically form large, often
docile aggregations at very specific locations during certain seasons, and often on
particular lunar phases. Knowledge of the timing and location of such aggrega-
tions is of obvious value to fishermen, and collectively the fishermen of Oceania
know far more about the local timing and locations of these aggregations than do
marine biologists {e.g., Johannes 1981, 1988, 1989). Because they occur at pre-
dictable times and places, spawning aggregations provide biologists with excellent
opportunities to monitor stocks. In addition, they provide a useful focus for man-
agement because exceptionally large catches are often made from them.
It was thus not for lack of interest that marine biologists had previously over-
looked the distinctive reproductive strategy of many tropical reef and lagoon
fishes and its implications for marine resource management. Native fishermen
beat them to this knowledge by centuries because they have always been far more
numerous than marine biologists, and they have been plying their trade and pass-
ing on accumulated knowledge for far longer.
Such knowledge extends beyond biology to the physical environment, includ-
ing local currents and the like {e.g., Johannes 1981). In addition, it often includes
a remarkably sophisticated and rich mental mapping system which may include
named features as small as larger individual coral heads (Nietschmann 1989; Hvid-
ing 1992). Since many village fishermen spend much of their lives operating within
a relatively small area, this is hardly surprising. The typically high visibility in
their waters coupled with the exposure of reef fiats during low tides facilitate the
development of this intimate spatial familiarity with the fishing grounds. For these
same reasons CMT boundaries can usually be defined and perceived with partic-
ular ease.
Traditional marine environmental knowledge can also play an important role in
the siting and management of coastal protected areas (Johannes and Ruddle, in
press). It is often superior in important respects to information gained by means
of conventional resource surveys performed by imported consultants constrained
by insufficient time and money. Local fishermens' knowledge of the timing and
location of significant biological events is not restricted to spawning aggregations.
Certain otherwise unremarkable beaches may serve as rookeries for nesting sea
turtles, or come alive with spawning land crabs during certain lunar periods and
seasons (Johannes 1981). What may look like an insignificant and relatively barren
islet to a reserve planner during a site inventory made in one season may be
thronged with breeding seabirds, sea turtles, or, in rare cases, sea snakes, in
others. In the absence of such local knowledge protected area planners are liable
to overlook areas with high conservation value.
Traditional environmental knowledge can also be invaluable in environmental
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greatly in identifying local vulnerable species and habitats, and locating them in
both space and, in the case of migrating animals, time.
However, this does not mean that the value of traditional environmental
knowledge can be taken for granted. Fishermen are fallible. Beliefs that declining
fish catches occur because "the fish have just gone elsewhere for a while" are not
uncommon in some areas, and in some places declining yields may be attributed
to sorcery or to a failure to propitiate the gods. Such beliefs may divert attention
from the real, and sometimes correctable causes. In addition, local interpretations
of natural history phenomena may conflict with established facts. But by dismiss-
ing too readily such false interpretations of natural phenomena, the researcher
risks overlooking the value of the empirical knowledge underlying them.
These caveats notwithstanding, the potential for the application of traditional
environmental knowledge to the management of marine resources in the Pacific
Basin is substantial. Such information must not only be collected and verified, it
must also be blended with more technical forms of biological research, like pop-
ulation dynamics, population genetics, physiology, and microbiology, among oth-
ers, before it can be put to best use. In addition, linguistic analysis is sometimes
required to determine the exact definitions of local taxonomies, to ensure that
fishermen and scientists are talking about the same species. All this is no small
matter. But the island fishermen can often show the marine biologist what ques-
tions to ask about the environment and where to look for the answers in order to
focus research on significant local environmental phenomena.
Traditional Conservation
The term "conservation ethic" has been defined as "an awareness of people's
ability to deplete their natural resources and a commitment to reduce or eliminate
the problem" (Johannes and MacFarlane 1991). Such an awareness and commit-
ment in relation to marine resources developed in many Pacific Islands.
Resource conservation by local societies, and especially within the rubric of
common property resources, is a complex subject and one about which data are
lacking to demonstrate quantitatively that any society is practising conservation
or that conservation is more beneficial than economic efficiency. Overall, the
evidence concerning conservation by traditional fishermen is mixed. But in Oce-
ania several types of marine resource conservation measure may have been tra-
ditionally consciously employed to ensure sustained yields (Johannes 1978). The
principal among these are the widespread reef and lagoon tenure systems,
whereby the right to fish in a particular area was controlled by a local social unit.
A wide range of other restrictions on fishing may also have been designed to
conserve stocks. Among these were the live storage or freeing of surplus fish
caught during spawning migrations, the use of closed seasons (particularly during
spawning), the placing of taboos on fishing areas, the reservation of particular
areas for fishing during bad weather, size restrictions (although this was uncom-
mon in Oceania), and. in recent times, gear restrictions (Johannes 1978. 1981.
1982). Others, many of which were related to traditional religious beliefs, also
functioned coincidentally as conservation devices.
Such practices are not static. And some of the new regulations that village
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explicitly conservationist. In Isabel Island, Solomon Islands, for example:
the community at Kia is contemplating restricting the use of nets with mesh
size under 3" linches] and at Tatamba the community is considering prohib-
iting the use of poisonous leaves and bush vines which kill young and small
fish. Although scarcity of marine products is mentioned only at Buala, the
questionnaire Ion customary marine rights] would indicate a more wide-
spread awareness of the importance of fisheries management. The Kia and
Tatamba communities appear to assume that this is a matter for self-
regulation within the community, in the customary manner (Ruttley 1987).
In Marovo, Lagoon, Solomon Islands, several reef-holding groups there have
gone beyond the level of contemplation and now enforce a variety of area-specific
restrictions, such as prohibitions on the use of nylon gill nets, poisonous leaves,
and spearguns, all for explicitly conservational reasons (Hviding 1988, 1991).
Nietschmann (1984) mentions that on Uvea. one of the Loyalty Islands,
. . . local villagers recently invoked traditional conservation measures to pro-
tect threatened marine resources. The eight villages along the 50 km atoll arc
formerly partitioned lagoon and reef environments and resources by custom-
ary rights to specific village fishing and crabbing grounds. French-introduced
Napoleonic Law does not recognise private or village rights to water space
beyond the tide line. Also introduced were efforts to modernise the lagoon-
reef fishery, including the establishment of freezers to encourage increased
exploitation for local consumption and export. The result was the overfishing
and reduction of lagoon fish stocks. Some villages then reimposed their tra-
ditional tenure rights, built a fence into the lagoon, banned spearing offish
and crabs and other fishing techniques and banned outsiders. Other villages
respected these conservation measures because they still recognised tradi-
tional village authority over its resource base.
Some claims regarding the environmental wisdom of traditional peoples have
been uncritical. For example, tabooing the hunting of or fishing for sacred species
has often been described as a traditional conservation measure. But this cannot be
assumed without closer investigation. Prohibitions on the taking of one species
which may be abundant locally may result in increased pressure on some other
more easily depleted species.
It would be unfortunate to read too much into these observations, however.
Richards (1980) states that "a sentimental belief in 'traditional values' and a gut
feeling that the 'people know best' without knowing why and under what circum-
stances, will be ... unhelpful." The romantic and uncritical espousal of tradi-
tional environmental knowledge and management is an extreme almost as unfor-
tunate as that of dismissing it. Traditional peoples have not lived in some preter-
natural state of harmony with nature. Some of their abuses of natural resources
have been, and remain, substantial [e.g., Johannes 1978).
Excessive claims for traditional environmental wisdom have provoked a back-
lash; some writers now dwell on examples of bad natural resource management
among traditional peoples, advancing the notion that traditional environmental
practices were basically unsound {e.g.. Diamond 1987). For example, much has
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lion by man. The blame is generally put directly on man, whereas little consid-
eration has been given to the possibility that the dogs and rats that came with man
played a major role in such extinctions.
The truth lies between these extremes; wise and unwise environmental prac-
tices coexist in many, if not most, cultures. Although we are concerned mainly
with the former, we do not underestimate the importance of the latter.
Not all traditional management practices were developed explicitly with con-
servation in mind. Some were more likely designed to provide a means of allo-
cating marine resources. Others have been, overtly at least, the outgrowth of
religious concerns not obviously related to conservation.
In addition, not all Pacific island cultures possess a marine conservation ethic.
Johannes and MacFarlane (1991) found no evidence for it among Torres Strait
Islanders, for example, and they speculate that a conservation ethic is less likely
to develop among people whose environmental limits are functionally unlimited
(see also Chapman 1985). Torres Strait Islanders, unlike many Pacific peoples,
have always had access to marine resources greatly in excess of their needs or
abilities to harvest. Other peoples in the region who appear traditionally to have
perceived no relationship between their fishing pressure and marine resource
availability include the Ponam of Manus, Papua New Guinea (Carrier 1987). But
where they exist, traditional conservation ethics and management practices pro-
vide a locally sanctioned code of behavior that can be harnessed to further the
objectives of modern marine resource management.
However, it is illogical to ascribe directly Western concepts of conservation
and human-environmental relationships to non-Western systems. Without de-
tailed on-site verification, it is ethnocentric to assume that either the intent or
coincidence of exclusive property rights was conservationist. In many instances
in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, for example, Polunin (1984) asserts that
systems of sea tenure are a response to conflict occasioned by resource scarcity.
However, this assertion, too, is over-simplified, disregarding, as it does, the dis-
tinction between resource conservation as an original intention and as an impli-
cation of CMT regulations (Hviding 1989).
The relationship between exclusive tenure systems and resource conservation
is further complicated by the relationship between humans and animals—respect
for the latter not necessarily resulting in their conservation (Brightman 1987),
present ecological situations and future environmental change (Townsend and
Wilson 1987), and social norms regarding the use of resources (Carrier 1987). For
example, Berkes (1987) observes that the Cree Indians of Canada regard the
assumption that animals can be manipulated to ensure future productivity as an
example of Western arrogance. Similarly, Carrier (1987) observes that Ponam
islanders of Papua New Guinea regard animals as active agents and humans as
passive. Thus the latter can do nothing to ensure the future productivity of the
former. Accordingly, among Ponam islanders exclusive fishing rights combined
with traditional ecological knowledge are perceived not as functioning as a con-
servation device, rather they serve to fulfil the social obligation to be generous
with marine products.
Nevertheless, since the resource bases governed by many CMT systems ap-
pear to have been sustained over many social generations, with the social objec-
tive of sustained self-sufficiency reinforced by sanctions against individual accu-
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conservationist in intent. However, this has often led to conflict with State re-
source law, and clearly changes in a great many instances under the tensions
introduced by development programs. And traditional CMT systems are under
assault in Oceania, for reasons often associated with demographic changes and
the introductions of new technology and a market economy [e.g., Johannes 1978,
1981). In many cases, customary systems have either disappeared or become
greatly hybridized under such pressures, whereas in others they have proven
remarkably resilient to progressive adaption, as in the cases of Japan (Ruddle
1987) as well as Marovo, Solomon Islands {Hviding 1989). and Palau. Micronesia
(Johannes 1981).
Priorities for Research and Policy-Design
The preceding indicates a number of general topics for research on CMT systems
and for the design and implementation of small-scale fisheries management, both
in the Pacific Basin and worldwide. They may be summarized as follows:
(1) The literature on existing CMT systems demonstrates that open access
cannot be assumed a priori for any small-scale fishery system. Rather, informa-
tion on territorial it y and customary regulations should be sought, and particularly
those that demonstrate the resilience of a system under pressure;
(2) Since documentation of CMT systems remains fragmentary and regionally
biased, comparative reviews must both pinpoint areas for intensive research (e.g.,
Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America) and define regions where existing
knowledge can facilitate the design of contemporary management models based
on customary systems (e.g., the South Pacific). It is important to ascertain if the
regionally fragmented CMT literature refiects the absence of systems or a lack of
research;
(3) CMT research must recognize that "custom" is dynamic, and that although
a "customary system" is not codified and remains responsive to change, it retains
tenacious roots in local culture and society;
(4) The utility of analytical concepts must be reexamined and interdisciplinary
terminology clarified;
(5) Applied research on existing CMT systems should concentrate on their
inherent adaptive dynamics and emphasize the outcomes of interactive processes
between them and larger political and economic systems, rather than just describ-
ing the functioning of such superficial phenomena as local fishery regulations';
(6) Building applied models for fisheries management requires an analytical
approach in which local sea tenure institutions are examined in terms of a re-
source system model (Ruddle and Grandstaff 1978; Grandstaff et al. 1980; Ruddle
and Rondinelli 1983; Ruddle 1991) that depicts socioeconomic and biological fiows
with the larger society and with other local resource systems. This is a logical
advance from factual accounts that merely record existing institutions;
' Even for the Pacific Basin much of the documentation of CMT systems is anecdotal and
fragmentary, and much of the more focused recent literature lacks detailed analysis of the
socio-political processes of such systems. There has also been little comparative analysis
of systems and their dynamics, and a failure to examine the contemporary political and
economic contexts of CMT systems makes it difficult to assess how they relate to the wider
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(7) Since fishery management is really the regulation of human activity, the
politics of resource use and allocation are crucial. Territorial regulations, gear
restrictions, and the like, whether customary or imposed, always entail the ex-
clusion of other fishermen and issues of equity, thus allocation and autonomy are
important considerations for policy-making and implementation. Also, since com-
pliance and cooperation by local fishermen operating in a managed system is
crucial to success, participatory planning and co-management are fundamental
issues;
(8) Research on the politics of resource use and allocation should focus on the
interrelationships among economic and political micro- and macro-levels, and
particularly on the role of the state in controlling local fishery resources, since
most fishery systems are enmeshed in larger-scale processes that extend far be-
yond the local level, and because institutional change involves micro- and macro-
levels in continuous interaction^; and
(9) The present and future role of CMT systems requires interdisciplinary
examination, with particular reference to such important contemporary topics as
the multiple use of resources and areas by several resource systems and in terms
of integrated coastal zone management planning, pollution, neglected research
topics, like gender and age division of labor, and migratory fisheries and migratory
fishing populations.^
Concluding Comments
Most Pacific islanders depend, for both subsistence and cash incomes, on both
marine and terrestrial resources. Throughout the region the controls on resource
use exercised by local groups and leaders embrace land, reefs and sea, a factor
that has a strong bearing on resource development and management policies and
programs. In the future, many customary resource management systems may no
longer be able to operate from a firm and independent basis in indigenous political
structures and without government intervention, as they have done for genera-
tions. Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness in the region of the need to
accommodate CMT systems in inshore fisheries development (Hviding and Rud-
dle 1991): It is the official policy of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Van-
uatu, and Fiji, for example, that tradition and "custom" must be properly accom-
modated in the development process.
At the same time, the difficulties inherent in developing and managing reef and
lagoon fisheries in areas under customary tenure is a source of frustration for
fisheries officials. Much of the recent attention given to CMT systems focuses
* The character and dynamics of any CMT system are tied to existing circumstances of the
particular fishery and to wider social, cultural, environmental, political, and economic
conditions. Researchers and policymakers must therefore be cautious about transferring
experiences and conclusions from one area or fishery to another. Further, although marine
tenure can clearly enhance the management of many fisheries, il is not a universal cure-all.
^ CMT can function to allocate equitably the catch from a migratory stock when it is in the
appropriate tenured area. But CMT is unlikely to be of much value in biological manage-
ment of such a stock unless all CMT systems into which the stock moves operate jointly to
control total harvest levels. This is impractical in many instances. But many species found
in tropical nearshore waters are not highly mobile, especially in coral reef and mangrove
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specifically on their potential role as local-level fisheries management mecha-
nisms in contemporary situations, since many appear potentially capable of over-
coming the problems of open-access fishing and of generating incentives for
rights-holders to harvest efficiently and to conserve and manage the resource. For
these reasons they may reduce the burden of government intervention, regulation,
and enforcement. From that perspective Johannes (1978), referring also to na-
tional policy, observed that a government which neglects the potentials of tradi-
tional systems "... disposes of a service it gets free and assumes responsibilities
it is ill-equipped to handle".
However, it should not be assumed unreservedly that CMT systems in the
Pacific Basin necessarily are, were, or will be effective fisheries management
systems in every instance. Their long-term function in conserving resources and
adapting to changed socio-economic conditions is the subject of considerable
debate {e.g., Polunin 1984; Carrier 1987).
But the uneven quality of the available literature and the general absence of
detailed evaluations of individual systems still preclude conclusive generaliza-
tions. Questions of local rationale and explanation, and of possible conservational
functions, can be fully answered only through intensive, localized, and multidis-
ciplinary field research.
Since fisheries development and management programs for the Third World
are dominated by Western economists and biologists, and their locally-based.
Western-trained counterparts, it is not surprising that programs are dominated by
locally inappropriate models. This approach is well-illustrated by most programs
of international assistance agencies, the main aims of which have been the eco-
nomically efficient exploitation of fishery stocks, based on an expansion of effort
through capital investment, higher technology in capture and marketing, im-
proved Western-style management, and the organization of marketing. All well
and good, were the common property-open access concept both valid and uni-
versal. Unfortunately it is not, and many well-intentioned programs often cause
irreparable socio-economic and cultural harm to coastal communities.
Alternatives, such as those presented by CMT systems, have rarely been
considered in fisheries development programs. CMT systems have survived in so
many widely scattered parts of the world for several reasons: They are proven
means of ensuring community survival through their capacity to ensure that basic
human needs are met; inclusion rights spread the risks inherent in resource un-
certainty and scarcity; CMT systems institutionalize equality of access and con-
fiict avoidance or resolution and are adapted temporally to fiuctuating resource
availability, and so contribute to local community stability. Compared with alter-
native arrangements they are easily, inexpensively, and locally enforceable.
Thus it has been frequently asserted, although usually with scant proof, that
traditional common property systems of inshore fisheries management can play a
potentially major role in the modern world by ensuring equitable access to fish-
eries, as well as in managing and enforcing conservation measures to ensure the
sustainability of coastal fisheries. The thesis generally is that the more the re-
sponsibility for the control of local resources can be left to local, traditional users,
the fewer will be the social, political, legal, conservation-related, and management
cost problems that must be addressed by governments. However, it is important
to realize that the "fossilization" of tradition through explicit, detailed legal def-
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traditional system (e.g.. Ruddle and Johannes 1985) as well as incur high social
costs (Wilson 1982).
At first sight the adaptation of traditional systems to a modem purpose may
appear to invite strong local resistance, since they are often so much part of the
way-of-life. But CMT systems, at least in many parts of the Pacific Basin, already
incorporate important elements of Western fisheries management. For example,
parallel management strategies include limited entry, seasonal, spatial, gear, size
or species restrictions, prior appropriation rights and the concept of sole owner-
ship, among others (e.g., Johannes 1978). In fact, many such strategies existed in
the Pacific long before their adoption in the West (Johannes 1978). In Western
marine economics sole ownership, limited entry, individual transferable quotas,
and other such fisheries management schemes are based on the theory of the firm.
On the other hand, in many Pacific societies the community is the sole owner, and
traditions of resource use and management are enforced by community norms that
control the behavior of the membership. But this, too. has its parallels in New
England and Western European fishing communities, among others, where so-
cially binding yet unwritten and informal rules carry more weight than official
regulations (Acheson 1987).
The design of management schemes should include as much as possible effec-
tive indigenous strategies, and should conform closely to existing socio-cultural
and marine habitat boundaries, and endeavor to adapt many of the traditional
institutions underlying such customary tenure systems as are appropriate for de-
velopment purposes (e.g., Rondinelli and Ruddle 1977. 1978; Johannes 1978; Em-
merson 1975, 1980; Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Runge 1986; Ostrom. Feeny and
Picht 1988; Baines 1989). Schemes should also be as simple as possible, to miti-
gate the potentially high social costs of regulation (Wilson 1982). Many traditional
sea tenure systems from the Pacific Basin may prove instructive in terms of their
cost effectiveness and social acceptability.
Community-based management systems reduce the need for the expensive
surveillance infrastructure required by centrally-managed local fisheries. In this
context, it should be noted that in many young Third World nations government
have only recently become involved in managing and monitoring local affairs.
Most lack the physical and administrative infrastructure, trained manpower ca-
pacity and the funds to do this at all, let alone in fine detail. Moreover, Western
multi-species management strategies are in their infancy.
Fishermen should also be active participants in designing their own future,
since they generally have a much clearer conception of some of the important
constraints under which they operate. However, where a tradition is lacking,
mobilization of fishermen for participatory planning may prove to be a long pro-
cess. And faced with growing pressures from intruding vested interests, local
fishing communities will need strong official support to defend boundaries to their
fisheries.
Another particular problem is attempts by local elites to take advantage of a
CMT system. Thus such systems will probably work better in relatively homo-
geneous societies and where the group size is relatively small (e.g., Berkes 1986).
However, it should be recalled that the concept of local management may confiict
politically with the concepts of nation-building, particularly in far-fiung archipe-
lagic nations as in Indonesia.
Areas traditionally managed locally under common property regimes haveManagement and Customary Tenure 269
been eroding owing to the pressures of Westernization, rapid population growth,
urbanization, commercialization of fisheries, the subsequent re-evaluation offish
as a commodity, with concomitant changes in technology and levels of capital
investment, and altered access and distribution rights and obligations. This began
decades ago in some places (Johannes 1978), as colonial governments consoli-
dated their power—a process that has continued under neocolonial regimes of
independent nation centralization. All this had led to a breakdown of local man-
agement and common property regimes.
In this regard, it is to be noted that CMT and associated activities must also be
understood in relation to a number of contexts not tied directly to fishing activi-
ties; the habit of aid agencies to sectorize projects and thereby failing to see
fishery development as an integrated component of rural development is a pre-
dominant example. Much remains to be learned about CMT systems beyond an
analysis of the traditional fisheries themselves. Interdisciplinary research must
also focus on entire national systems of fishery production, and particularly on the
relationship between household (traditional) and capitalistic (modern) production
within the system. Through site-specific analysis and numerous detailed case
studies, this research must also further elucidate the principles of CMT systems
and correct many erroneous interpretations that characterize earlier research on
the topic, in order to provide systematic information on the great number of such
systems operating under an enormous variety of biological, physical, and socio-
cultural settings.
Further research will show the characteristics and dynamics of the great va-
riety of CMT systems throughout the world. Such variety, while not precluding
the abstraction of generalizable concepts and principles of organization, must also
serve to warn policy-makers and fisheries planners that there is no universal
panacea for the problems of the equitable and economically efficient management
in CMT systems; none of these institutions provides a universal "best solution",
since each management system represents a local response to a specific set of
opportunities and constraints.
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